



# BULLETIN



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## EXECUTING KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MISSION COMMAND

*A Primer for Senior Leaders*



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# **Executing Knowledge Management in Support of Mission Command A Primer for Senior Leaders**

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## Foreword

Knowledge management (KM) has been an important part of Army doctrine for over a decade, and a significant element of mission command for nearly as long. In that time, KM programs have become embedded in Army and Department of Defense organizations at all levels and integral to operational success. Yet, we still find senior Army leaders who are unsure how to employ their KM personnel, and combat units at the Combat Training Centers unable to employ the knowledge management process effectively.

Hence, this primer, developed using lessons learned from Soldiers in the field and the Combat Training Centers, has been prepared by the Army Knowledge Management Proponent. It is intended to provide senior Army leaders a concise understanding of KM and what they can do to improve important organizational processes (e.g., the military decisionmaking process and operations process). It briefly discusses basic KM concepts, the roles of senior leaders in KM, and provides some techniques senior leaders may choose to employ in managing a KM program.

This primer incorporates lessons learned from a variety of organizations which have established successful KM programs. The most important of these lessons is that senior leaders must actively participate in their KM program if their KM program is to be successful. I recommend Army senior leaders read this primer as a means of improving organizations across the Army.

*“Knowledge management enables commanders to make informed, timely decisions, despite the uncertainty of operations.” (ADP 3-0, Operations)*

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. Mingus'.

**James J. Mingus**  
Major General, USA  
Director, Mission Command Center of Excellence



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## **Executing Knowledge Management in Support of Mission Command**

The concept of collecting, analyzing, and distributing knowledge is not new to the American Army. What is new is the sheer, overwhelming volume of tactical and organizational information modern organizations must deal with, and how we think about the management of that knowledge — a concept Army senior leaders must understand. Modern Army organizations simply cannot succeed if they fail to effectively manage the process of acquiring and using that knowledge. Recent trends from the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) indicate that units often fail in three main areas: developing and maintaining an effective common operational picture (COP), understanding critical paths and battle rhythm, and ability to reliably access information across the Army. Specifying knowledge management (KM) tasks for the commander imparts a direct responsibility on the part of the commander and all senior leaders to establish and execute a KM program. Mission command doctrine and KM doctrine have become a single operational concept, inseparably linked. The key takeaways from this primer are that KM is integral to mission command, enables the operations process, enables decision making, and improves staff integration.

### **Knowledge Management is Integral to Mission Command**

Mission command is an inherent part of all operations. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command*, defines three commander's tasks, directly or indirectly enabled by KM: (1) drive the operations process, (2) develop teams, and (3) inform and influence audiences. The most important of these tasks — drive the operations process — is directly enabled by KM.

### **Knowledge Management Enables the Operations Process**

An effective KM program provides the means to deal with the inherent problems involved in collecting and managing the knowledge necessary to accomplishing that task.

*“Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based upon applying judgment to available information and knowledge. As such, commanders and staffs seek to build and maintain situational understanding throughout the operations process. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decision-making.”* (Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 5-0, *The Operations Process*)

This is actually another way of describing the Army’s KM objective: “Getting the right information, to the right people, in the right format, at the right time, in order to arrive at the right decision.”

### Knowledge Management Enables Decision Making

Situational understanding is at the foundation of the decision-making process. That situational understanding is at the heart of the KM process — enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making.

*“ . . . knowing if, when, and what to decide and understanding the consequences of any decision. Commanders first seek to understand the situation. As commanders and staffs receive information, they process it to develop meaning. Commanders and staffs then apply judgment to gain understanding. This understanding helps commanders and staffs develop effective plans, assess operations and make quality decisions.”*  
(ADP 6-0, Mission Command)

KM assists senior leaders in balancing the art of command with the science of control by enabling the most important leadership task — decision making (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. KM enables decision making

The objective of KM is to create shared understanding through the alignment of people, processes, tools, and organization in order to increase collaboration and understanding. The resulting improved knowledge flow enhances situational understanding, manifesting itself in better decisions. KM enables senior leaders to make informed, timely decisions despite the uncertainty of operations or the type of operations.

## **Knowledge Management Improves Staff Effectiveness**

An effective KM program keeps the staff focused on the KM tasks of creating, organizing, applying, and transferring knowledge. Staffs employ KM to provide commanders with the information necessary to create and maintain their understanding of the situation and to make effective decisions. Staffs use information and KM practices to assist commanders in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information. This cycle of information exchange provides the basis for creating and maintaining understanding. ADP 6-0 defines four primary staff tasks critical to the conduct of mission command: (1) Conduct the operations process, (2) Conduct KM and information management, (3) Synchronize information-related capabilities, and (4) Conduct cyber electromagnetic activities.

## **The Senior Leader as the Knowledge Leader**

The senior leader, as the central figure in mission command and the operations process, must also be intimately involved in the methods that provide the information necessary to those processes and the commander's most critical function — decision making. Mission command strives to establish the mindset that situational understanding comes from a balance of bottom-up and top-down knowledge processes. This requires that senior leaders also function as their organizations' "knowledge leaders."

These fundamental knowledge processes, the foundation of which is individual tacit knowledge, require the same kind of leadership that ADP 3-0 requires of the decision-making and operations process. In other words, senior leaders must drive the knowledge processes that are fundamental to mission command and operations. Successful KM programs require senior leader involvement. To be fully successful in exercising mission command, organizations require an effective KM program.

Leaders at all levels must drive KM as much as they drive the operations process. This includes the personnel and organizations involved in their KM program: the knowledge management officer (KMO), KM section (if authorized), knowledge management representatives (KMRs), and the knowledge management working group (KMWG). They must also support KM training and KM activities such as knowledge assessments, battle rhythm analysis, and content management.

This level of involvement requires more than just establishing commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and then allowing organizational knowledge processes<sup>1</sup> to manage themselves. Effective collection, analysis, and transfer of knowledge among the staff and commander require an analysis of those processes. Commanders must analyze their knowledge needs, analyze how the staff presents that knowledge, and determine if those needs are met by existing knowledge processes and products.

The senior leader should assess which information is critical and whether the staff is providing that information in an easily accessible format. With this assessment, the senior leader can ensure the staff understands and can act on those requirements. Senior leaders must identify their knowledge requirements, and ensure the organization establishes the means to acquire that knowledge (i.e., an organizational KM program).

### **Knowledge Leader Guidelines**

**Understand** and implement KM doctrine.

**Establish** a KM program.

**Provide** guidance on knowledge requirements.

**Implement** KM training and planning.

**Focus** KM efforts on knowledge processes instead of knowledge tools.

**Use and Evaluate** the effectiveness of knowledge processes and products.

Knowledge management is primarily a human process and is heavily dependent on organizational leadership for direction and supervision. Operational success requires that senior leaders provide clear operational intent and clear knowledge requirements (commander's intent, critical information requirements, etc.).

### **Army Knowledge Management Doctrinal Foundation**

KM is “the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making.” (Army Techniques Publication [ATP] 6-01.1, *Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management*) KM facilitates the transfer of knowledge between staffs, commanders, and forces. Army KM is composed of four components:

- **People** (those who create, organize, apply, and transfer knowledge, and their leaders)
- **Process** (the methods of creating, organizing, applying, sharing, and transferring knowledge)
- **Tools** (digital and non-digital knowledge tools used to put knowledge products and services into organized frameworks)
- **Organization** (the organizational matrix in which people, processes, and tools function)

Army KM is the alignment and balancing of these four components. Although tools, especially digital tools, are often misconceived as the primary component of KM, the far more important aspects of KM are the people and the processes they use to create, organize, apply, and transfer knowledge. There is often a significant challenge in the perception that “KM is SharePoint” where senior leaders treat KM as little more than establishing SharePoint in their organizations. A growing misperception in private industry is that KM is a subset of Big Data where they tout it as the technical solution to many of the Army’s analysis issues. In its current state, Big Data will not solve cultural and manpower issues regarding record and content management. Big Data does not capture, preserve, or analyze tacit knowledge.

KM is not technology, but rather a process senior leaders use to enable the mission command principle of creating shared understanding and accomplishing the mission command task of conducting KM. Army KM is a 5-step process (assess, design, develop, pilot, and implement) and is more about improving knowledge flow by establishing an effective KM program.

The KM process focuses on the transfer of knowledge between individuals, teams, and units through collaboration. KM fosters individual and collective learning and contributes to developing learning organizations by integrating informal learning, organizational learning strategies, and KM capabilities. Successful KM depends on a willingness to share knowledge so others can benefit. This sharing contributes to building an environment of trust and mutual understanding. This is why senior leaders should initially focus resources on analyzing and developing knowledge processes in their organization.

**Assess** information flow in the organization.

**Design** KM programs that effectively and efficiently improve information transfer.

**Develop** a KM solution to the problem, and the requirements, processes, and procedures which implement the KM solution.

**Pilot** the KM solution by implementing it on a small scale and testing it with Soldiers. Identify and correct problems, and prepare it for full implementation in the organization.

**Implement** the validated KM solution, to include training and coaching personnel in their roles and responsibilities. Monitor implementation in order to identify and correct problems.

## **The Knowledge Management Team**

As with all other organizational processes, leaders conduct KM through a team of subordinate leaders and staff. The primary members of this KM team are the commander (the decision maker and knowledge leader, providing guidance and intent); the chief of staff or executive officer (providing leadership, enforcement, and a mission command focus); the KM officer (responsible for assessing and improving knowledge processes); and the KM working group (responsible for developing and implementing the KM process). See Appendix A for more information on the composition and aspects of the KM team.

## **Implementing a Knowledge Management Program**

The most effective means to implement a KM program is to use the KM process itself, beginning with an assessment of organizational knowledge processes. This assessment will identify performance and knowledge gaps of organizational knowledge processes that may hinder getting the right information to the right people, in the right format, at the right time, in order to arrive at the right decision, producing the right effects.

As senior leaders conduct their assessment of organizational knowledge processes, they may start with a particular knowledge process they perceive is not working as intended or desire to improve knowledge flow without a specific gap in mind. In either circumstance, implementing an effective KM program generally begins with the senior leader directing the implementation of a KM program and issuing initial guidance for that program.

Timely and clear leader guidance, based on an analysis of the senior leader's knowledge requirements, is critical to successful KM programs. This guidance can be described in terms of KM vision and goals, leading to a KM strategy and implementation plan for the organization. Guidance can also be described in terms of specific knowledge processes to be improved.

However, the most essential guidance senior leaders can provide to their KM team is to clearly identify the knowledge they require for decision making. Such guidance should lead to an assessment (by the KMO with the KMWG) of how knowledge is created, codified, and presented to meet the senior leader's needs. This is not particularly new, as it is a KM perspective of the CCIRs. Within the context of a KM program, codifying leader knowledge requirements often gets lost in the rush to implement technical tools to manage knowledge processes. The following vignettes describe how leaders benefit from successful KM programs. There is a direct correlation between decision behavior and risk to shared understanding. Decisions are more anticipatory with lower risk, resulting in greater understanding (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Creating shared understanding

### Knowledge Management Program Vignettes

**Common Operational Picture (COP).** “A single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command.” (ADRP 6-0) An organization’s COP is the primary means for collecting and presenting critical decision-making information within and between units, though they often prove to be not as common nor as useful as desired.

Recent observations (consistent over several years) by MCTP state that “the COP was not effective in contributing to shared understanding during movement or when troops were in contact with the enemy,” and that “units fail to develop and maintain a COP that allows the commander (and staff) to quickly assess the operational environment.” (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL] Bulletin 17-05, *Mission Command Training in Unified Land Operations, FY 16 Key Observations [CAC access required]*)

A successful COP facilitates shared understanding and is focused on providing critical information for leadership decisions. Some COP considerations include how the information is to be displayed, the tools used to collect and analyze the information, processes, and the organizations involved in developing and displaying a COP.

**COP Vignette:** Though not the final arbiter of how the COP is designed and used, the organization's KMWG can be an effective means of designing and developing the COP. The KMWG, using the KM process, can help ensure the COP is an effective means of providing a shared understanding of tactical and organizational information by assessing the knowledge processes that feed the COP. This assessment includes the tools used to display the COP and how that COP is used by the people in that organization.

**Battle Rhythm.** "A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations." (Field Manual [FM] 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*) MCTP observations indicate that "battle rhythms do not follow a critical path to lead to branches, sequels, or recommendations for commander decisions," noting that "battle rhythm events are not nested to facilitate a critical path within the decisive action framework that enables an understanding of the enemy, current and projected capacity of self, and environmental impacts to operations. As a result, divisions are challenged to achieve the shaping effects desired and are quickly reduced to combat-ineffective ground forces." (CALL Bulletin 17-05)

An organization's battle rhythm is the primary means of synchronizing the collection, analysis, and presentation of decision-making information. A battle rhythm that fails to provide critical information in a timely and usable manner hinders mission command and decision making. A successful battle rhythm improves understanding and requires less time for the same work. Battle rhythm analysis is not unique to one organization. The fundamentals are the same.



**Battle Rhythm Vignette:** Battle rhythm analysis is not unique to one organization. The fundamentals are the same. First, before an event is added to the battle rhythm, an analysis must take place to determine the necessity of the event. To determine that, there needs to be a shared understanding of the underlying meetings striving for a spot on the battle rhythm. For senior leaders, the rule of thumb is calculating how this event supports their decision cycle. An effective tool is a 7-minute drill or event charter. Each meeting lead prepares a drill and presents it to the chief of staff/executive officer who, based on the 7-minute drill's content, determines if it needs to be added to the battle rhythm. Another technique to conduct the battle rhythm analysis is breaking it up into components (planning horizons, warfighting functions, joint phasing, or critical paths). Using the KMWG can greatly improve rigor by providing detailed analysis of the knowledge flow, inputs, outputs, and resulting decisions. Such an analysis not only initiates KM concepts and practices across the organization, but can be used as a pilot project to establish an organizational KM program.

**Content Management.** Content management tends to be a continuing problem in every organization. Fast-flowing knowledge supports mission command only when it can be quickly and easily accessed. Content management should be one of the first tasks the KMO takes on. This requires an effective content management plan (part of a KM standard operating procedure [SOP]) that establishes standards and processes. However, there is more than just establishing standards and processes. Effective content management requires an effective KM training program as well, which is where most KM programs fall short.

**Content Management Vignette:** Self assessments from the field indicate that a majority of units struggle with content management. This finding in Army units is similar to the trend in the private sector where less than one in four rated their organization's content management as effective (American Productivity and Quality Center [APQC], 2015). Army units tend to fall short because of the difficulty in developing content management standards and defining these standards in the organization's KM SOP. Units tend to find more success in content management when KMRs are active participants in the development of metadata standards and enforcers of the standards and processes of the unit's KM program. KMRs must also be leaders of change as the unit implements its KM program and, more importantly, they must often function as KM enforcers. KMRs must be active implementers, ensuring KM standards, processes, and procedures are adhered to within the staff section. KMRs must be more than just conduits for knowledge flow within and outside of the staff sections, they must function as managers of knowledge flow, staff sections' leaders in implementing KM, and primary action officers in changing how their staff sections do business.

**Knowledge Management Maturity Model.** Every organization, operational or institutional, faces the challenge of assessing the status of its KM program. If a unit's leadership cannot assess where its KM program stands and what it is trying to achieve with KM, it can be difficult to determine what to do next (see Figure 3).

Unit leadership can use the KM Maturity Model (KM3) to develop a baseline assessment of a KM program. The objective of KM3 is to provide an organizational aid to assessing and improving organizational effectiveness. More importantly, KM3 is designed to enable the KM team to help the organization execute mission command more effectively. See Appendix B for more information on KM3.




Figure 3. KM3 concept

**Knowledge Management Training.** KM training is an important aspect of KM that tends to be overlooked. Every unit, especially in the early stages of sustainable readiness, experiences problems with untrained or incompletely trained Soldiers. The tendency has been to establish complicated procedures (usually some type of tools-centric site implementation with a lengthy SOP) without any regard to training. Soldiers are expected to “just pick it up.” The result is often an instantaneous dislike of KM, causing Soldiers to avoid using the KM process as intended. Commanders will have to develop and implement their own KM training if their KM programs are to be effective. Commanders are urged to leverage the Army Knowledge Management Qualification Course (KMQC), which awards the Knowledge Management Professional Skill Identifier/Additional Skill Identifier (SI/ASI 1E). There is also the Army Knowledge Management Basics (AKMB) distance learning course available on the Army Learning Management System (ALMS).

### **Putting it All Together**

KM is the common thread in aligning the mission command system and must be pervasive to achieve cognitive overmatch and shared understanding (see Figure 4). Army KM is an integral part of mission command doctrine, but continues to be visualized as a digital tool or an organizational portal. This is the main reason senior leader involvement is so critical to the development and implementation of a KM program. Organizations too often only adjust along the margins of process or technology change that has limited impact on their performance. The causes primarily are due to cultural friction or inertia. In most cases, the information needed for effective and timely decision making has been captured within the organization; it just is not being shared. Creating that shared understanding is the objective of a KM program.

Knowledge leaders must keep in mind that knowledge integration, shared understanding, and organizational adaptability in support of mission command should be at the core of their KM program. Senior leaders should ensure their programs are focused on the KM objective: Getting the right information to the right people, in the right format, at the right time, in order to arrive at the right decision.




Figure 4. Clarifying mission command

**Endnote**

1. The term “knowledge process” is not a doctrinal term; it is used here to describe any command or staff process which involved the acquisition and use of knowledge or information.



## Appendix A

### The Knowledge Management Team

Doctrinally (Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 5-0, *The Operations Process*), the chief of staff (CoS) is responsible for coordinating and integrating the efforts of the staff. As part of the knowledge management (KM) team, the CoS must be able to visualize the staff's processes for collecting, analyzing, and transferring knowledge; assess those processes; and ensure the staff's efforts are coordinated and effective. It is important for the CoS to ensure the knowledge management officer (KMO) has visibility of all staff processes and a means to implement change in those processes. Early involvement by the CoS (such as the implementation of a KM standard operating procedure [SOP]) makes a significant difference to the effectiveness of a KM program.

Doctrinally (Army Techniques Publication [ATP] 6-01.1, *Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management*), the KMO directs the KM section and advises senior leaders on implementing KM. However, there is a continuing problem in that the KMO is often only thought of as "the SharePoint guy." Although technological tools are the most common means of implementing knowledge processes, experience has shown that the successful KMO must be more than a technologist. The successful KMO must be well grounded in mission command, the operations process, and the military decisionmaking process. An understanding of how technology supports these processes is useful, but not critical. What is critical in a KMO is the ability to analyze and improve those knowledge processes that most affect mission command and decision-making processes.

The KMO must also be more than just another staff officer. The KMO must be in a position to visualize, assess, and improve staff processes across the organization. The KMO most often functions as a "knowledge catalyst," making staff processes faster, more efficient, and more effective. This requires the KMO to focus on knowledge requirements and knowledge processes and not technology or tools.

The next member of the KM team is actually a group: the knowledge management working group (KMWG). This working group — normally established by the CoS/executive officer as an extension of the organization's staff — is focused on developing, improving, and implementing organizational knowledge processes. The KMWG is the primary venue for the leadership to assess and improve knowledge flow within the organization; it is the senior leader's means of improving critical knowledge processes. The KMWG is the senior leaders' (normally through the CoS) means for influencing the KM program; selecting the personnel involved is critical to the organization's KM program.

Organizations use KM to provide leaders the knowledge they need to maintain situational understanding and make effective decisions. Information is disseminated, stored, and retrieved according to established information management practices. KM practices enable the transfer of knowledge between individuals and organizations. Knowledge transfer occurs both formally (through established processes and procedures) and informally (through collaboration and dialogue). With such processes, the staff creates and maintains shared understanding, making the KMWG a vital link between the senior leader and his staff.



## Appendix B

### Knowledge Management Maturity Model

In 2009, the U.S. Army War College (AWC) published a paper addressing the need for an Army version of a Knowledge Management Maturity Model (KM3) and included a concept of what it might look like. Several maturity models have been developed in the private sector, namely by two organizations: Carnegie-Melon University and the American Productivity and Quality Center (APQC). Using the AWC document as a basis, KM3 was further developed. When used by a unit, it will provide a baseline assessment of a knowledge management (KM) program's maturity. The objective of the KM3 tool is to improve organizational effectiveness. Most importantly, this tool is designed as an enabler for the KM team to help the organization exercise mission command more effectively.

The model currently consists of a matrix, defining 42 KM efforts, grouped under the four components of KM: people, process, tools, and organization. By scoring these efforts with a standard 1–5 Likert scale (higher is better), an organization's KM team can assess the status of its KM program, identify areas needing improvement, and track that improvement over time. Efforts may be related to other efforts in other components as well. There are also tabs within the tool that contain a description of each effort, how each effort contributes to KM maturity, as well as suggested reference material that can aid in improving the areas where an organization may need emphasis. Although an assessment using the KM maturity model is somewhat subjective, it has proven to be a good tool for assessing an organizational KM program.

The Army's 5-step KM process starts with assess (followed by design, develop, pilot, and implement). The KM maturity model can be an effective means for leaders to assess how well their organizations are exercising KM in support of mission command. For example, one effort listed under the "people" component is "terms of reference" (TOR), a document containing a summary of key people within an organization and their specific roles and responsibilities within the command structure. This contributes to KM maturity in that a well-developed TOR document helps eliminate confusion as to who reports to whom and, more specifically, it enhances shared understanding regarding roles and responsibilities.

[[UNIT]] KM Maturity Model							
KM Principles: <i>Understand, Share, Integrate, Connect, Learn, Trust</i>							
Range: 1=Notdoing it, 5=Validated Effort (rate uni/organization for level of implementation of each effort)							
People	A	B	C	D	Score		
Terms of Reference	4	Onboarding	3	IM Tools	4	Culture of Collaboration	4
KM Roles and Responsibilities	2	Continuity	1	Collaboration Tools	3	Communities of Purpose	3
Battle Rosters	2	After Action Reviews	2	Lessons Learned Repositories	2	Organizational Trust	2
KMWG	2	KM/Staff Rehearsals	1	KM SOP	3	KM Vision	2
External SMEs	5	KM Process	2	KM Strategy	2	Learning Environment	3
KMRS	5	KM/IM Tools Training	2	Validated COP	3	Cohesive Teams	3
		CCIR/SIR Management	4	KM Planning (Annex Q)	2	Social Interaction	2
		Operations Process	2	Battle Rhythm	4	Organizational Feedback	3
		COP/Dashboard Management	3	Working Groups and Boards	3	Mission Command	3
		Time Management	3	PACE Plan	3	KM Chain of Command	2
		Lessons Learned Management	2	Learning Tools	5		
		Task Management	2	Expertise Location System	3		
				Virtual Communities	4		
				ORG SOPs Policies	3		
Column Total (Max=30 Points)	17	Column Total (Max=60 Points)	27	Column Total (Max=60 Points)	27	Column Total (Max=50 Points)	31

Overall Unit Maturity Rating		2.83	
Assessment Date			
KMRS: 31			

[[UNIT]]			
KM COMPONENT SCORE	People	Process	Tools
	17	60	44
MAX SCORE	30	60	70
AVG	2.83	2.25	3.14
TOTAL KM MATURITY SCORE	119	210	66.7%

Figure B-1. KM3

## Appendix C

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**NOTE:** Some CALL publications are no longer available in print. Digital publications are available by clicking on “Publications by Type” under the “Resources” tab on the CALL restricted website, where you can access and download information. CALL also offers Web-based access to the CALL archives.

CALL produces the following publications on a variety of subjects:

- **Handbooks**
- **Bulletins, Newsletters, and Observation Reports**
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### **COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC) Additional Publications and Resources**

The CAC home page address is: <http://usacac.army.mil>

#### **Center for Army Leadership (CAL)**

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal>.

#### **Combat Studies Institute (CSI)**

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp>.

#### **Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)**

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) at <http://www.apd.army.mil> or the Central Army Registry (formerly known as the Reimer Digital Library) at <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

#### **Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)**

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G-2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil>.

#### **Military Review (MR)**

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview>.

#### **TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)**

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G-2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas.

#### **Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID)**

CDID conducts analysis, experimentation, and integration to identify future requirements and manage current capabilities that enable the Army, as part of the Joint Force, to exercise Mission Command and to operationalize the Human Dimension. Find CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/cdid>.

#### **Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)**

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

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